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INSIDER TRADING BY AN ISSUER
UNDER JAPANESE LAW
Misao Tatsutat
Abstract: This Article explores the impact of the 1994 amendments to the Commer-
cial Code on the Japanese Securities and Exchange Law, especially as they pertain to
insider trading by stock issuers. The Article identifies limited situations, both in tender
offer and public stock market contexts, in which companies may purchase their own
stocks. Specifically, the Article addresses the issuer's repurchase plan, the necessary
elements of disclosure, and the penalties for non-disclosure. The Article analyzes the
amendments and questions their effectiveness in addressing the problem of insider
trading.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Japan owes its disclosure philosophy to William E. Gladstone, via
Franklin D. Roosevelt.I The writer is not sure whether Gladstone was cog-
t Professor of Law, Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan; LL.M. (University of California, Berkeley);
LL.B. (H6gakushi), (Kyoto University).
1 Gladstone is the father of modem English company law. The Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844,
which included disclosure requirements to cope with securities fraud, was drafted while he was President
of the Board of Trade. L.C.B. GOWER, GOWER'S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 38-40 (5th ed.
1992). U.S. federal securities laws, pushed forward by Franklin D. Roosevelt, were modeled after the U.K.
Companies Act with respect to disclosure philosophy. I LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES
REGULATION 180 (3d ed. 1989). Japan copied main provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the
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nizant of insider trading, whereas Roosevelt certainly must have known it
since he signed the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which contained sec-
tion 16.
The phrase "disclose or abstain" is symbolic insofar as it indicates
that insider trading is one of the most important issues related to disclosure.
There is no room for insider trading to take place where all material infor-
mation is completely disclosed. In reality, however, most corporations
cannot help but keep some material information confidential. In this sense,
full disclosure cannot be tantamount to complete disclosure. Thus, human
weakness, or brazen face, may give rise to insider trading.
Japan was a latecomer to regulating insider trading. On the other
hand, Japan was among the first to strictly prohibit a company from pur-
chasing its own shares. In 1988, Japan first introduced clear provisions to
ban insider trading.2 In 1992, it strengthened its enforcement vehicle. 3
Then, in 1994, Japan loosened its restriction on the repurchase of a com-
pany's own shares. 4 An issuer is an utmost insider. The 1994 lift of the
ban, though partial, increased opportunities for insider trading by issuers.
This Article sketches out what a combination of these factors looks like.
Part II briefly describes legislative history of Japanese insider trading
regulation that culminated in the monster-like set of provisions in 1988. It
also relates background of the 1992 amendments which brought forth the
Securities Surveillance Commission. Part III then explains statutory provi-
sions on repurchase by a company of its own shares, before and after the
1994 amendments. Part IV examines stipulations specific to an issuer's
insider trading from the viewpoint of investor protection.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 of the United States when it enacted the Sh6ken Torihikih6 [Securities
and Exchange Law], Law No. 25 of 1948 [hereinafter SEL. MISAO TATSUTA, SECURITIES REGULATION IN
JAPAN 10 (1970).
2 Sh6ken Torihiki H6 no Ichibu o Kaisei suru H6ritsu [Amendment of the SEL], Law No. 75 of
1988.
3 Sh6ken Torihiki no K6sei o Kakuho sum tame no Sh6ken Torihiki H6 t6 no Ichibu o Kaisei suru
H6ritsu [Amendment of the SEL to Secure Fairness in Securities Exchanges], Law No. 73 of 1992.
4 Sh6ken Torihiki H6 no Ichibu o Kaisei suru H6ritsu [Amendment of the SEL], Law No. 70 of
1994.
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II. INSIDER TRADING AND ITS CRIMINALIZATION
A. The Dark Ages
The original version of the Securities and Exchange Law of 1948,
transplanted the general anti-fraud provision 5 from U.S. Rule 1Ob-5,6 the
reporting requirement as to changes in shareholding by directors, supervi-
sors, and ten percent shareholders7 from section 16(a) of the United States
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,8 and a provision to have these insiders
disgorge short swing profits9 from section 16(b) of the same Act.10
The reporting requirement, however, was repealed five years later in
1953.11 Both the general anti-fraud provision and the short-swing profit
provision have been almost dormant for more than forty years.12
Later amendments introduced a prohibition on directors and employ-
ees of securities companies (broker-dealers) from trading securities by
making use of special information obtained by virtue of their position, such
as the trend of customers' orders.13 The Ministry of Finance, which is in
charge of administering the Securities and Exchange Law, issued a release
warning insiders to refrain from engaging in illegal trading. But, unlike
other releases, this was not made open to the public for some unknown
reason. 14 From time to time, it was reported that stock exchanges made
inquiries and warnings as to suspected insider trading. These were not
publicized either.
5 SEL art. 58 (1948); SEL art. 157 (1994).
6 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994).
7 SEL art. 188 (1948). SEL art. 163 (1994) is linked with the Finance Minister's warning measure
stipulated in art. 164. See supra note 6.
8 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1988).
9 SEL a-t. 189 (1948). SEL art. 164 (1994) is much improved. Where the Minister of Finance
suspects from the filed report that any of the insiders has not paid to the corporation the amount of the
short-swing profits, the Minister shall send to the insider a statement of such profits, and upon suspecting
that the insider has not complied, the Minister shall make the statement open for public inspection.
10 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(1988).
i Misao Tatsuta, Enforcement of Japanese Securities Legislation, I J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG.
95, 112 (1978) [hereinafter Tatsuta, Enforcement].
12 Id at 107.
13 Shokengaisha no kenzensei no junsoku tou ni kansuru shorei [Ministerial Rule Concerning
Standards of Soundness for Securities Companies], Ministry of Finance Rule No. 60 of 1965, art. 1, Item 5(now art. 2, Item 5).
14 Tatsuta, Enforcement, supra note 1I, at 133, n. 142.
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Scholars were of the opinion that insider trading was violative of the
general anti-fraud provision, and that civil liabilities as well as administra-
tive and penal sanctions would ensue.15 However, the government took a
rather negative view. A report of the Securities Council, submitted to the
Minister of Finance in 1976, denied applicability of the general anti-fraud
provision to insider trading on the ground that it was too broad and ambigu-
ous. 16
In 1987, two questionable cases made headlines in mass media. One
case was related to the insolvency of a medium-size chemical company
listed on the Osaka Stock Exchange: one of the lead banks sold out its
holding on the verge. The stock exchange investigated, but finally
announced that it could not get evidence of an insider trading. 17
The other case involved a business merger between Shin Nippon
Steel, the top steel manufacturer, and a medium-sized bearing manufacturer.
Upon announcement of the tie-up, the latter's stock price rose. Before then,
some Shin Nippon employees, who had been engaged in the negotiation,
had purchased shares in the latter, According to the employees, the motive
was not to gain profits, but to become intimate with their employer's pro-
spective partner. They did not know that insider trading was illegal. The
shares purchased were not large in amount. No legal step was taken against
them.18
B. Dawn
People were angry about these cases and public confidence in the
stock market was at bay. The Ministry of Finance hurried to build up a
quadripartite scheme to cope with insider trading. Emphasis was placed on:
(1) prevention, (2) reporting requirements, (3) impetus to disgorge short-
swing profits, and (4) penalties for certain types of insider trading.
The 1988 amendments to the Securities and Exchange Law, after the
examples of British and French legislation, placed emphasis on the penalty
15 Id. at 133, n. 137.
16 Id. at 112.
17 ASAHI SHINBUN, Oct. 6, 1987, at 1.
18 ASAHI SHINBUN, Aug. 27, 1988, at 1.
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aspect, though it is not heavy.19 Insiders and inside information are defined
in detail.20 The method of publicizing, which is relevant to draw the line
between legal and illegal trading, is also precisely defined. As a result, a
tremendous body of insider trading statutes emerged, embracing not only
provisions of the Securities and Exchange Law but also those of cabinet
rules and Ministry of Finance rules.2 1 They took full effect on April 1,
1989.
Punishable insider trading is classified into two categories in terms of
the nature of inside information. One relates to business information of the
issuer, such as discovery of a rich ore mine, prospective increase in divi-
dends, serious litigation, insolvency, and so on.22 The other category relates
to takeovers. Once a company has decided to launch a tender offer, an
insider, director, employee, or some other affiliate, may not buy shares in
the target company until it is publicized. Or an insider may not sell shares
in the target company, once a company has decided to discontinue an
already publicized tender offer scheme until the discontinuance is publi-
cized. An insider is subject to the same restriction when a company has
decided to purchase shares in another company amounting to five percent or
more of the aggregate outstanding shares.23
This emphasis on "tender-offer-related insider trading" sounds rather
strange. It is true that the Securities and Exchange Law and rules thereun-
der have detailed provisions on tender offer. But during the period of
almost twenty years between 1971, when the said provisions were intro-
19 The maximum penalty is imprisonment with forced labor for six months, a fine of ¥500,000, or
both. SEL art. 200, Item 6 (1988). A much heavier penalty is now imposed on one type of the crime. See
infra note 42.
20 As for the definition of insiders, see infra note 37. Conveyance of inside information and trading
by tippees are not inclusively regulated. The statute only prohibits one who has been notified of material
facts by one of the defined insiders from trading in the stock before such facts are publicized. SEL art.
166, para. 3; art. 167, para. 4 (1988). Thus, a tippee's tippee is free to trade, unless the first tippee is
regarded as a mere conduit.
21 English version of statutory provisions as of the promulgation can be found in KAZUMi OKAMURA
& CHIEKO TAKESHITA, LAWS AND REGULATIONS RELATING TO INSIDER TRADING IN JAPAN (Compiled by
the Secondary Market Division of the Securities Bureau, Ministry of Finance, 1989, Commercial Law
Center, Inc., Tokyo).
22 SEL art. 166, para. 2 (1992) enumerates four types of material facts: (I) certain matters that have
been decided upon by a corporate organ; (2) certain matters that have taken place; (3) certain changes in
publicly announced estimate figures; and (4) a catch-all clause. The above (I) is subdivided into eight
(then seven) items and the cabinet rule adds nine items thereto. The above (2) is subdivided into four items
and the cabinet rule adds eleven items. Thus, on a simple calculation, thirty-three items are designated as
material facts.
23 SEL art. 167 (1994).
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duced, and 1990, when they were revised so as to make them neutral and to
render certain tender offers compulsory,24 only two tender offers took place
in Japan. Both of them were friendly, and it is doubtful that a tender offer
was the best device in those two cases.25 Although there were some hot
proxy contests in the 1950s, those raiders were generally regarded as some-
what asocial. The better method, according to the general view, is to
conduct a merger or to tie-up amicably, either upon request from the target
or with the help of some senior intermediary. It will be much easier to
operate a business after a merger of this type, rather than after taking over
against the will of the target.
III. PURCHASE BY A COMPANY OF ITS OWN SHARES
A. Before 1994
The Commercial Code of Japan, when it was enacted in 1899, strictly
prohibited a corporation from acquiring its own shares.26  The 1938
amendment of the Code introduced three exceptions for the reacquisition of
shares: (1) for the purpose of their retirement; (2) as a result of corporate
merger or acquisition of another business by transfer; and (3) when neces-
sary for exercise of the corporation's rights, i.e., in satisfaction of a debt.
27
By virtue of the 1950 amendments, which copied several features of U.S.
corporations law including appraisal remedy for dissident shareholders, the
fourth exception was added so as to allow a corporation to acquire its own
24 Before the 1990 amendments, a tender offeror had to notify the target company of the project ten
days in advance. SEL then art. 27-2 (1972). According to the present statute, you must resort to the device
of tender offer whenever you plan to purchase shares from more than 10 persons which will result in your
holding more than five percent of the outstanding shares in the target company, or whenever you plan to
purchase shares which will result in your holding more than 30% of the outstanding shares, unless the
purchase is made in the open market. SEL art. 27-2, para. I (1994).
25 One of them was made in 1972 by Bendix Corp. in order to integrate a Japanese affiliate into
consolidated accounting. The other took place in the same year as a device to consolidate three power
companies that had been separately operating during the Okinawa occupation. After the effectiveness of
the 1990 amendments, a few compulsory tender offers were made so as to transfer controlling shares. No
shareholder other than the controlling shareholders tendered his shares, perhaps because the price was
unattractive.
26 SHOHO [Commercial Code], Law No. 48 of 1899, art. 151, para. I [hereinafter Commercial
Code 7 Commercial Code art. 210, Items 1-3 (1938).
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shares in response to an exercise of appraisal rights by dissenting share-
holders. 28
As the statutory provisions have changed, the way of looking at
repurchase of shares has also changed. When repurchase was initially
prohibited without any exception, courts and commentators explained that it
was logically impossible for a corporation to be a member of itself.29 How-
ever, after the 1938 amendment, the reasoning of theoretical impossibility
was inconsistent with the provisions whereby a corporation may repurchase
its own shares under certain exceptions. Then, scholars generally regarded
the restriction on reacquisition as deriving from policy reasons: mainte-
nance of capital; equality of shareholders; just and fair control; and just and
fair stock transactions.30 This change of view released policy arguments to
the extent of prohibiting corporate repurchase. After World War II,
business circles repeated their request to ease the restriction.
Another turning point was the 1948 amendment. Before then, pay-
ments for stock were made by installment. A repurchase by the corporation
of its shares which were not fully paid was tantamount to excusing the
selling shareholder from his duty to pay. The 1948 amendment replaced the
installment payment with full payment at the time of stock issue. Mainte-
nance of capital, the strongest policy reason for restricting repurchase, lost a
part of its weight, because all of the issued shares were fully paid. This
change somehow gave strength to the case for easing the restriction de lege
ferenda, and to the argument that a violative repurchase should not be con-
28 Commercial Code art. 210, Item 4 (1950). Appraisal remedy has been expanded. In six
occasions, a corporation can repurchase its own shares. The 1950 version granted a remedy to dissenters on
two occasions: (1) where the corporation transfers all or an important part of its business, leases, entrusts
management of, or participates in a pool of profit and loss with regard to, all of its business, or acquires
whole business of another corporation, Commercial Code art. 245-2 to art. 245-4 (1950); and (2) where the
corporation enters into a merger agreement, Commercial Code art. 408-3 (1950). The 1966 revision added
another occasion, (3) where the corporate charter is amended so as to restrict transfer of shares.
Commercial Code art. 349 (1966). Another occasion was then added by the 1990 amendment, (4) where
the corporation transforms itself into a limited liability corporation. Yugen-gaishah6 [Limited Liability
Corporation Law], Law No. 74 of 1938, art. 64-2. Aside from these remedies, (5) a shareholder is entitled
to have the corporation purchase his shares that are less in number to form a "unit," as no certificate may
be issued for such small number of shares. Supplementary Provisions to the Commercial Code, art. 19
(1981). Lastly, (6) a holder of fractional shares has the same right where the corporate charter provides
that no certificate is issued to represent fractional shares. Commercial Code art. 230-8-2 (1990).
29 Judgment of Sept. 27, 1922 (Japan v. Hanamoto), Saik6sai [Supreme Court], I KeishO 483; J.
Matsumoto, Kaisha no jiko kabushiki no shutoku [Reacquisition by a Corporation of its Shares], 55
HOGAKU SHIRIN 11 (1904).
30 Misao Tatsuta, Patterns of Restricting Share Reacquisitions by Corporations: Jiko kabushiki
shutoku no kisei ruikei, 6 LAW IN JAPAN: AN ANNUAL 128, 133 (1973).
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strued to be void. Some argue that a repurchase is not hazardous, so far as it
is made within the limit of disposable surplus.
B. The 1994 Amendment
The Legislative Council ignored the repeated request on the part of
various business circles to ease the restriction. However, in 1993, it was
rather difficult for the Council to keep its stance. The stock market was in
severe recession, mainly as a result of economic depression, and was also
aggravated by the existence of an excessive volume of shares that had been
issued too easily during the earlier boom years. The Tokyo Stock Exchange
Price Index ("TOPIX") fell, from its peak above 2,800 in 1989, down below
1,200 in 1992. Trading volume shrunk to a critical level for broker-dealers.
New issue of shares was frozen by virtue of administrative guidance. Cor-
porations found it impossible to raise funds by means of equity finance. A
trigger for recovery was needed.
The Cabinet formulated a set of emergency policy measures to cope
with the recession. Among them was the proposal to ease the restriction on
corporate repurchase of shares. This was not persuasive for some scholars.
But the scheme was mightily pushed by business circles. They argued that:
treasury shares help operate employee stock ownership plans; repurchase of
shares enables the issuer to engage in flexible finance schemes; owning
stock is the safest means of investment; shareholders will enjoy a higher
rate of dividends with a smaller number of outstanding shares; repurchase is
necessary for a closely-held corporation to prevent undesirable outsiders
from joining it on occasion of a shareholder's death or a need to sell one's
shares when the remaining shareholders cannot afford to buy them, and so
forth. Business circles pointed out active repurchase by U.S. corporations
and enabling state statutes, but they shut their eyes to the safe harbor rules
of federal regulation. 31 Many scholars were cautious in easing the restric-
tion,32 but cries from businesses outrivaled in volume the academic sermon.
31 Rule 1Ob-18; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-18 (1994).
32 E.g., Egashira, Jiko-kabushiki shutoku kisei no kanwa mondai ni tsuite [On the Problem of Easing
the Restriction on a Corporation's Repurchase of Its Own Shares], 1302 SHOJI HOMu 2 (1992); Yoshihara,
Jiko-kabushiki shutoku kisei no kanwa ni kansuru ronten (ichi) [Issues Relating to Easing the Restriction
on a Corporation's Repurchase of Its Own Shares (1)], 107 MINSHOH6 ZASSHI 325 (1992) and Yoshihara,
Jiko-kabushiki shutoku kisei no kanwa ni kansuru ronten (ni) [Issues Relating to Easing the Restriction on
a Corporation's Repurchase of Its Own Shares (2)],108 MINSHOHO ZASSH 337 (1993); Iwahara, Jiko-
kabushiki shutoku kisei no minaoshi 65) [Reexamination of the Restriction on a Corporation's Repurchase
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The Ministry of Justice made an inquiry as to the desirability of easing the
restriction, and an overwhelming number of organizations responded in the
affirmative. Thus, the statute was amended.
The 1994 amendment added four exceptions. First, a corporation
may repurchase its shares for the purpose of transferring them to its em-
ployees, on condition that the annual meeting of shareholders authorizes it
and that the aggregate number does not exceed three percent of its outstand-
ing shares.33 Second, a corporation may repurchase its shares for the pur-
pose of their retirement if the annual meeting of shareholders authorizes it.34
Third, where transfer of shares is restricted by the corporate charter, the
of Its Own Shares, Vol. I], 1334 SHOJI HOM 45 (1993) and Iwahara, Jiko-kabushiki shutoku kisei no
minaoshi (ge) [Reexamination of the Restriction on a Corporation's Repurchase of Its Own Shares, Vol. 2],
1335 SHOJI HOM 12 (1993). On the other hand, some scholars are sympathetic to the request of easing
the restriction to a certain extent. E.g., Otori, Jiko-kabushiki no shutoku seigen no kanwa ni tsuite [On
Easing the Restriction on a Corporation's Repurchase of Its Own Stock], 485 TOKYO KABUSHIKI
KONWAKAI KAIHO I (1991); 6sumi, .Jiko-kabushiki shutoku kisei no kanwa ni tsuite [On Easing the
Restriction on a Corporation's Repurchase of Its Own Shares], 1295 SHOJI HoM 2 (1992) and Jiko-
kabushiki shutoku kisei no kanwa ni tsuite, Teisei sairon [On Easing the Restriction on a Corporation's
Repurchase of Its Own Shares, revised version] 1309 SHOJI HOM 36 (1993); Kanda, Jiko-kabushiki
shutoku to kigy0 kinyu 65) [Repurchase by a Corporation of Its Own Stock and Corporate Finance, Vol. 1 ],
1291 SHOJI HOMO 2 and Kanda, Jiko-kabushiki shutoku to kigv kinyu (ge) [Repurchase by a Corporation
of Its Own Stock and Corporate Finance, Vol. 2] 1292 SHOJI HOMu 7 (1992).
33 Commercial Code art. 210-2 (1994). The main object of this exception is to help operate
employee stock ownership plan. The corporation may also transfer the shares to those employees who
have been working for it for longer than certain years. The Code contemplates these cases when it says
"for the purpose of transferring the shares to its hired person (shyonin) for just causes." The term
"employee" (jugyoin) is not found in the Code, and the draftsmen chose the term "hired person" that is
already used elsewhere within the Code, though both have the same meaning.
4 Commercial Code art. 212-2 (1994). Prior to the amendment, a corporation could retire shares
only in the course of reducing the stated capital or in accordance with the charter provision. Commercial
Code art. 212, para. I (1988). According to the majority view, the charter provision authorizing retirement
must be found in the original charter or must be inserted by a unanimous consent of the shareholders. This
is impracticable.
Another barrier was tax law. Where a corporation retires the shares out of its surplus, the law
regards the part of the stated capital corresponding to the number of retired shares as being distributed to
the remaining shareholders. Thus, the government levies tax on them as well as on the retiring shareholder
who gets capital gain. Shotokuzeih6 [Income Tax Law], Law No. 33 of 1965, art. 25, para. 2, Item 1;
Hojinzeih6 [Corporation Tax Law], Law No. 34 of 1965, art. 24, para. 2, Item 1. While corporation
lawyers are opposed to this notion of "constructive dividends," tax lawyers support it. Takeuchi,
Jikokabushiki shutoku kisei no kanwa to shouu5 zeih5 [Easing the Restriction on Repurchase by a
Corporation of Its Own Shares in the Light of Commercial Law and Tax Law], 1286 SHOJI HOMu 2
(1992). A corporation is exempt from obligation to pay withholding tax for "constructive dividends" when
retiring its shares, as a result of tax law amendment in 1994. Sozei tokubetsu sochih6 [Special Measures
Tax Law], Law No. 26 of 1957, art. 9-5. This revision, without repealing the notion of "constructive
dividends," has given rise to another problem: how to fix the shareholder obliged to pay the tax when
shares are transferred.
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corporation may preempt the shares, if a shareholder requests an approval
and the proposed transferee is not desirable for the corporation. 35 Fourth, a
corporation of the same category may repurchase its shares from heirs of a
deceased shareholder within one year of the shareholder's death.36
In each of these four cases, a corporation may purchase its own shares
only out of its disposable surplus. A publicly-held corporation may pur-
chase only in the public stock markets. 37 A closely-held corporation may
repurchase only when authorized by a special resolution of the general
meeting of shareholders, and the notice therefore must state that any share-
holder is entitled to a request to add him as a seller. This Article does not
attempt to explain in detail these and other requirements on repurchase
imposed by the Commercial Code.
IV. ISSUER As AN INSIDER
A. Repurchase Plan Is Material Information
As has been described above, the Securities and Exchange Law
defines in detail the persons who are regarded as insiders, the facts that are
regarded as material, and the means whereby information is deemed to be
publicized. The somehow inflexible framework of this sort derives from the
draftsmen's belief that a statutory provision which may cause penal sanction
must be framed in an unambiguous way. The better view is that punishment
is one thing and prevention or relief is another thing: the latter should be
framed in flexible terms.
Before the 1994 amendment to the Commercial Code, repurchase by
a corporation of its own shares was really an exception, and the Securities
and Exchange Law paid little attention to it. Along with easing the restric-
tion by the Commercial Code, the Securities and Exchange Law also
35 Commercial Code art. 204-3-2 (1994). It is necessary that the preemption is authorized by the
general meeting of shareholders. The maximum number of shares to be repurchased is twenty percent of
outstanding shares, together with those repurchased in accordance with (4) below.
36 Commercial Code art. 210-3 (1994). It must be authorized by the general meeting of
shareholders. And the limit is twenty percent together with the shares repurchased pursuant to (3) above.
37 The public stock markets include stock exchange markets as well as the over-the-counter market
administered by the Japanese Association of Securities Dealers. Commercial Code art. 210-2, para. 8; art.
212-2, para. 4 (1994). A publicly-held corporation may resort to a tender offer, when it purchases its own
shares in order to retire them in accordance with the repurchase plan approved by the annual meeting of
shareholders. See infra note 38.
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underwent an amendment to cope with unfair practices relating to an
issuer's repurchase.
The 1994 amendment inserted the phrase "acquisition of own shares
pursuant to the provision of article 210-2 or article 212-2 of the Commercial
Code" into the definitional enumeration of material facts in relation to
insider trading.38 Once the annual meeting of shareholders has approved
the repurchase plan, the directors are authorized to repurchase shares in
accordance with the approved plan during the period of approximately one
year, to wit, until the close of the next annual meeting of shareholders. 39 So
long as the issuer has already publicized the repurchase plan, the issuer may
purchase shares without publicizing each particular transaction to be carried
out.4 0
With regard to the issuer's repurchase, such elements as the date, the
amount, and the market are all material facts. They should be disclosed
before the directors carry out each transaction, even though the annual plan
itself has been publicized. But disclosure of these elements would certainly
affect the stock price, and would make it difficult for the issuer to purchase
shares pursuant to the plan. Thus, the Securities and Exchange Law only
requires disclosure of the repurchase plan, and not of a particular schedule
of each trade.4 1 Only the issuer itself is exempt from prohibition from
trading in the shares without disclosing these particulars. Insiders other
than the issuer4 2 are prohibited from purchasing the shares until the particu-
38 SEL art. 166, para. 2, Item I(iii) (1994). This is one of the thirty-three material facts defined by
the statute. This item covers only two out of the four grounds of repurchasing shares added by the 1994
amendment to the Commercial Code: i.e., (1) transfer to the employees and (2) retirement of shares. The
other two grounds, i.e.. (3) refusal of the proposed transferee of restricted shares and (4) occasion of
succession of such shares, are related to closely-held corporations and irrelevant to the stock markets.
39 Commercial Code art. 210-2, para. 4; art. 212-2, para. 4 (1994).
40 SEL art. 166, para. 5, Item 4-2 (1994). It is the repurchase plan that must be publicized. The
repurchase plan ought to be authorized by the annual meeting of shareholders. Thus, the issuer may
publicize the fact that the annual meeting has authorized the repurchase plan. However, even before then
the issuer may publicize the fact that the board of directors, or the executive committee as the case may be,
has decided to propose the repurchase plan to the annual meeting of shareholders. If the annual meeting
authorizes the proposal without any modification, the public announcement of the proposal suffices to
dispense with the need for further publication of each repurchase to be carried out.
41 Special Subcommittee on Fair Trading, Securities Council, Shokentorihiki Shingikai Koseitorihiki
Tokubetsu-bukai, Jiko-kabushiki shutoku tou no kisei kanwa ni tomonau shokentorihiki seido no seibi ni
tsuite [On Establishing Necessary Means under the Securities and Exchange Law in Connection with
Easing Restriction on Repurchase by an Issuer of Its Own Shares], Ill I (3) 3 (Feb. 7, 1994), reprinted in
1346 SHORI HOMu 24 (1994).
42 The fact is that an issuer is not one of the enumerated insiders within the statutory definition. The
defined insiders are as follows: (I) the directors, agents and employees of the issuer; (2) 3% shareholders
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lar schedule of repurchase is publicized-even after the annual repurchase
plan has been already publicized-so long as they are aware of the
particular schedule such as the date, the amount, and the market because of
their respective position. Thus, it is true that the exemption does not mean
an entire lift of the ban. But it is quite regrettable and ironic that a
particular schedule of each trade is not required to be disclosed on the very
ground that it is price sensitive.
B. Trading by An Issuer When It Has Material Information
Another response on the part of the Securities and Exchange Law to
ease the restriction on repurchase by the 1994 amendment to the Commer-
cial Code was the enactment of new provisions on tender offers by an
issuer. A publicly-held corporation may, instead of purchasing its shares in
the public stock markets, resort to a tender offer, when it purchases its own
shares out of surplus in order to retire them in accordance with the repur-
chase plan approved by the annual meeting of shareholders. 43 Statutory
requirements for an issuer's tender offer are similar to those stipulated for a
tender offer initiated by a raider: public announcement in newspapers,
delivery of a tender offer prospectus, abstention from purchasing the shares
who are entitled to inspecting books and records of the issuer (before the 1990 amendment only 10%
shareholders were entitled to inspection. Commercial Code art. 293-6); (3) persons who have statutory
power over the issuer, such as members of a regulatory body; (4) parties to a contract with the issuer, such
as a bank, an underwriter, and the prospective constituents of a merger with the issuer; and (5) the
directors, agents and employees of the foregoing, where they are a juridical person. SEL art. 166, para. 1
(1994). Similar definition of insiders is found in SEL art. 167, para. 1 (1994) with respect to trading in
connection with take-overs. Since it was virtually impossible for an issuer to purchase its own shares prior
to the 1994 amendment to the Commercial Code, the omission of an issuer from the definition of insiders
was not astonishing. An intelligible way of legislation would have been to add an issuer to the definition
on occasion of easing the restriction on an issuer's repurchase, so long as the statute adheres to the
enumerative definition which is by no means an advisable policy. See supra note 17 as to the treatment of
tippees. The draftsmen seem to expect that a director is barred to purchase shares on behalf of the issuer as
well before material facts are publicized, and that this prohibition covers an issuer's insider trading.
43 Commercial Code art. 212-2, para. 4 (1994). The ceiling is 10% of the aggregate outstanding
shares as to the issuer's repurchase out of surplus for the purpose of retiring the shares. Thus, it may
happen for an issuer to purchase a substantial amount of shares in a short period for this purpose. Whereas
the ceiling is only 3% as to repurchase for the purpose of supporting an employee stock ownership plan,
and the 1994 amendment did not make a tender offer available for this purpose. Commercial Code art.
210-2, paras. 1, 3, 8 (1994).
VOL. 4 No. 3
INSIDER TRADING IN JAPAN
otherwise than the tender offer during its period, pro rata purchase on occa-
sion of over tender and so forth.44
Apart from the common requirements on both tender offers, by an
issuer and by others, one provision is noteworthy in connection with insider
trading. An issuer planning to initiate a tender offer must publicize such
material facts, if any, as defined by the statute prior to the date on which it
files the tender offer statement with the Minister of Finance.45 During the
tender offer period, the issuer-offeror must publicize the same upon occur-
rence of such event or upon knowing that there exists a material fact which
has not been publicized: the issuer-offeror must also notify the shareholders
who have tendered or are to tender the shares of such material fact.
Noncompliance with this obligation will entail civil and penal sanc-
tions upon the issuer, its directors, and supervisors. On the civil side, they
are jointly and severally liable for damages as to the loss suffered by the
seller-shareholders due to the failure of disclosure or misstatement.46 The
penalty is the heaviest one among the crimes stipulated by the Securities
and Exchange Law.47
In contrast to the strict stance against non-disclosure in case of a
tender offer, the statute does not provide for equivalent sanctions as to the
issuer's purchase in the public markets without disclosing material facts.
The directors, agents, and employees of the issuer must abstain from trading
the stock in the issuer, on behalf of the issuer, as well as for themselves
when they are aware of any of the enumerated material facts and the fact has
not been publicized.48 But, it is these individuals themselves who violate
the explicit provision when buying shares on behalf of the issuer without
44 SEL art. 27-22-2, para. 2 (1994). This article is a provision of formidable style, listing up a
number of provisions on tender offer by a person other than the issuer which are applicable mutatis
mutandis to a tender offer by the issuer, with numerous substitutions of terms. It symbolizes the
draftsmen's lack of attitude to make the Securities and Exchange Law to be shared with the public at large.
45 SEL art. 27-22-3, para. I (1994). In order to fall within the definition of "to have been
publicized," it is necessary for twelve hours to elapse after revealing the fact to media of communication
including at least two of such qualified media as daily press of general or financial news, news agencies, or
broadcasting ftrms. SEL art. 27-22-3, para. 3 (1994); SEL Enforcement Rule art. 14-3-11 (1994).
46 SEL art. 27-22-3, para. 2 (1994). A seller who knew the fact is not entitled to the remedy. A
defendant is not liable if he proves that he did not know the existence of the unpublicized material fact
notwithstanding his devoting reasonable care.
47 For the individual offenders, an imprisonment with forced labor up to three years, a fine up to V3
million, or both. SEL art. 197, Item 3-2 (1994). For the issuer corporation, a fine up to ¥300 million. SEL
art. 207, para. 1, Item I (1994). Compare these penalties with the case of ordinary insider trading, supra
note 16.
48 Supra note 37.
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publicizing the material fact. They will be subject to the penal sanction.49
Also, it may be possible for the issuer corporation to be'subject to a penalty,
but it is the same as is imposed on the individuals who actually purchased
the shares, i.e., a fine up to V500,000.50
The scope of applicability of the aforementioned provision on civil
liability is expressly confined to the situation where the issuer-offeror fails
to publicize a material fact in connection with a tender offer. There is no
statutory provision that renders a person liable for damages as to insider
trading in general. In theory, it may be possible to resort to the general anti-
fraud provision5 l and to regard its violation as meeting the requirement of
illegality stipulated by the general tort provision which is a statutory basis
for damages.5 2
Where insider trading is committed in the public stock markets, there
may be a number of victim-sellers and a number of buyers other than the
insider, the issuer in the present discussion. It would not make sense to sort
out some of those victims whose sell orders match with buy orders of the
issuer. A possible solution may be to have the issuer pay the balance
between the stock price after revelation of the material fact and the purchase
price, then to distribute the amount pro rata among the sellers at the time of
the issuer's purchase. This remedy would result in selecting the victims by
chance and satisfy them only in part, but it would have an effect at least to
deter insider trading by an issuer, without subjecting it to damages of astro-
nomical figures.
When it comes to a face-to-face trading, there is no such complexity
as in the case of trading in the public stock market. The issuer should be
held liable for damages vis-A-vis the seller as to the loss caused by non-dis-
49 SEL art. 200, Item 6. The penalty is much less severe. See supra note 42.
50 SEL art. 207, para. I, Item 3 (1994). It is not entirely doubtless that this provision is applicable to
the issuer because the issuer itself is not among the addressees of the provision which prohibits insider
tradinji Seesupranote37.
Supra note 2.
52 MINPO [Civil Code], Law No. 89 of 1896, art. 709. The construction described in the text was
the way academicians argued for imposing civil liability on a performer of an insider trading prior to the
1988 amendment to the Securities and Exchange Law. The Securities Council, however, turned down this
view. See supra note 13. Now that there exist detailed statutory provisions of penal nature, most
commentators seem to neglect the significance of civil liability. The writer once expressed his view as to
how to formulate provisions on civil liability. Misao Tatsuta, Naibusha torihiki no kouka ni kansuru
ripporonteki kousatsu [Consideration de lege ferenda of effects of an insider trading], in KIGYOHO NO
KENKYU [Studies on Business Law] (collection of essays dedicated to Professor Ohsumi) 706 (1977);
Misao Tatsuta, Naibusha torihiki ni kansuru horitsu shian to teian shushi [A Private Tentative Draft of
Insider Trading Law and Comments thereto], 746 SHOJI HoMu 2 (1977).
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closure of a material fact. It is inappropriate to ignore the remedy of this
sort under the pretext of complexity which pertains only to trading in the
open markets.
V. CONCLUSION
Japanese business circles at last attained their long-cherished demand
by the 1994 amendments. But the ban was lifted only in part. The allowed
repurchases are subject to several restraints, such as: the ceilings as to total
amount of purchase price and total number of shares to be purchased in
relation to the aggregate number of outstanding shares; the procedural
requirements of approval by the general meeting of shareholders; and direc-
tors' liabilities ensuing from resultant shortage of disposable surplus.
Above all, the 1994 amendments did not accede to the request from some
groups to legitimize free repurchases, nor did they accept the proposal to
insert a discretionary ground for repurchase of a German type to the effect
that an issuer may acquire its own shares when necessary to cope with an
emergency. In these respects, the 1994 amendments, as a big change in
Japanese corporation law as they are, do not satisfy business circles, and
they will request further deregulation.
An opportunity has been newly opened for an issuer to purchase a
substantial amount of its own shares. The statutes on insider trading, as
grand a maze as they look, have an important impact on Japanese corporate
transactions. How and to what extent the 1994 amendments can cope with
the evil of insider trading by an issuer, the most likely performer of insider
trading, is to be seen in the future.
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